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Climate leaders?
 (from left) Presidents 
Dilma Rousseff from 
Brazil and Barack Obama 
from the U.S.; former 
Mexican President Felipe 
Calderón; Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan 
Singh; and China’s 
lead negotiator 








After 20 years of 
UN-sponsored 
summits on climate 
change, the world 
seems no closer to a 
binding commitment 
to enforce reduced 
carbon emissions. 
So, if a grand global 
climate compact is 
unlikely, what’s next?
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limate change has been called the big-
gest global cha llenge of the current 
generation. As scientifi c uncertainty 
has diminished, climate change has 
emerged as an important item on the 
international institutional agenda.
But efforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and minimize the ef-
fects of human-caused climate change through bind-
ing international agreements often miss key emitter 
nations or lack follow-up by signatory countries when 
negotiators return home. Moreover, the legitimacy of 
such negotiations and their conclusions is called into 
question, since they often lead to national policies that 
are partial, complex and hard to verify.
Does that mean international global climate meet-
ings are a failure?
It depends on how you defi ne success. The talks 
have been instrumental in setting the global 
climate agenda, but when it comes to actually 
reducing global emissions, setting binding 
targets, or developing global mechanisms for 
funding, technology transfer and enforcement, they 
have generally been a waste of time.
The principal reason is their structure, which makes 
it diffi cult to develop meaningful, enforceable policy.
Since the problem of climate change is global, it 
makes sense to set goals and limits on a global scale to 
better track progress and ensure that emissions do not 
reach dangerous levels. In a perfect world, these would 
be easy to achieve. However, agreeing upon the best 
course of action to meet reductions and gaining buy-
in from every country is exceed-
ingly diffi cult.
The basic problem is the 
distinct self-interest of de-
veloped and still-develop-
ing nations.




lems were evident 
f rom t he  e a r l i -
est attempt to set 
global standards for the en-
vironment. Following the Rio 
Earth Summit in June 1992, 
the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate 
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for contributing to global climate change, and different 
abilities for alleviating it. The treaty specifi ed that devel-
oped countries (Annex I) should reduce their emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2000, while less developed countries 
(Annex II) were only required to provide assistance to 
the reduction goals of Annex I countries.
It set three obligations, imposed principally on de-
veloped nations:
• A gradual return to 1990 levels of greenhouse gas  
emissions;
• Provision of fi nancial resources and technology  
to developing countries to promote sustainable 
development; 
• Provision of data on emissions and mitigation 
efforts.
Change (unfccc) was established to “stabilize the green-
house gas concentration in the atmosphere to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic, or human-caused, interfer-
ence with the world’s climate system.”1 The Convention 
came into effect in March 1994 and has 195 signatories 
today.2
However, it did not set mandatory limits on green-
house gas emissions for individual countries and con-
tained no method of enforcement. To account for 
differences in levels of economic development, the treaty 
applied the principle of “common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities.” The principle established a common re-
sponsibility to protect the planet from the impacts of 
climate change, but at the same time recognized that in-
dividual countries had different levels of responsibility 
All mayoral hands on deck: (from left) Mayors Ecktar Wuerzner of Heildelberg, Franklin Tau of Johannesburg, Won 
Soon Park of Seoul, Eduardo Paes of Rio de Janeiro, Michael Bloomberg of New York, Babatunde Fashola of Lagos, 
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In 1997, international negotiations led to the Kyoto 
Protocol, which required signatory countries to reduce 
emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels 
by 2012. During the fi rst commitment period, 37 industri-
alized countries and the European Community signed on, 
and it became international law in 2005. The fi rst com-
mitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012, and 
the second commitment period lasts from 2013 to 2020.
Under the Protocol, countries must meet their targets 
mainly through national measures.3 However, additional 
means are offered, including the Clean Development 
Mechanism, which allows developed countries to meet 
their targets by implementing emissions reduction proj-
ects in developing countries.
The Protocol did not assign targets for developing 
countries. Instead, these countries agreed to reduce emis-
sions and commit to renewable energy by improving en-
ergy effi ciency and reducing deforestation. Because of 
this, though the United States signed the Kyoto Treaty, 
it was never introduced to the U.S. Senate for ratifi ca-
tion. Instead, by a 95-0 vote, the Senate passed an amend-
ment in 1997 expressly requesting that the U.S. not enter 
into any treaty requiring reductions that could prove 
damaging to the economy or that would not hold de-
veloping nations to the same commitment schedule as 
developed countries.
Without the world’s then-leading emitter, the Proto-
col’s effectiveness was limited from the start.
Several attempts have been made since Kyoto to se-
cure missing countries (the U.S.) and make the commit-
ments more aggressive. But little progress has been made 
in developing agreements with real teeth.
The 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Copenhagen, Denmark, included the 15th Conference 
of the Parties to the unfccc and the 5th Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and was perhaps the most 
hyped of recent meetings. This was due in no small part 
to the presence of President Barack Obama at the ne-
gotiating table and the hope—based on his comments 
during the presidential campaign—that the U.S. might 
emerge as a new leader in climate change.
Those hopes failed to materialize.
The Copenhagen Accord, drafted at the conference, en-
dorsed the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, but did 
not contain binding commitments for reducing green-
house gas emissions. Despite some important discus-
sions on deforestation, forest degradation and climate 
adaptation, disagreement remained over the “common 
but differentiated” responsibility between developed 
and developing nations.
Obama, on behalf of the U.S., pledged to reduce green-
house gas emissions by 17 percent by 2020—the lowest 
of all national pledges. Since it never produced a legally 
binding treaty—as many had hoped—the Copenhagen 
summit was widely considered a failure.
With far less fanfare, international talks continued 
with the goal of concluding a successor to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. But at the 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Doha, Qatar, all the parties could agree to was to extend 
the life of the Kyoto Protocol until 2020.
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development, 
also known as Rio+20, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 
2012, was the 20-year follow-up to the 1992 Earth Sum-
mit. The primary result of the conference was the non-
binding document, “The Future We Want,” in which the 
192 heads of state in attendance renewed their political 
commitment to sustainable development and declared 
their commitment to the promotion of a sustainable fu-
ture. Though welcome, a public commitment without a 
binding agreement remains simply rhetoric.
By the Rio+20 conference, only the EU members at 
the time of the original Kyoto Summit and Canada, Po-
land, Hungary, Japan, and Croatia had reduced their emis-






































































































































































Without the U.S., the world’s 
then-leading emitter, the 
Kyoto Protocol’s effectiveness 
was limited from the start. 
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it is not bound to the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. also met 
this (low) target.
But even this reduction is most likely the result of a 
decline in the global economy during that time, rather 
than national efforts at emissions reduction. Further, 
aggregate global emissions continued to increase dur-
ing the same time—largely due to the rapid develop-
ment of China and India.
None of this is to say that international climate talks 
have been a complete bust. To understand their value, 
we need to place them in context and see them for what 
they are—and what they are not.
While not as lofty as the original expectations, in-
ternational climate talks have succeeded in increasing 
public awareness of the issues and bringing new items 
to the political agenda. By convening governments, 
they have elevated the importance of climate change 
to the highest levels of government. While there is still 
much to communicate to the public about the science, 
the risks, and the costs of mitigation and adaptation, 
climate change over the past 20 years has entered the 
mainstream political dialogue.
Further, these forums serve as information exchanges 
among national policymakers, experts, local and re-
gional leaders, and private, non-profi t and ngo lead-
ers. This network has become a platform to share ideas, 
new technologies, new science, and best practices, and 
to foster important relationships.
No Silver Bullet
W
hile international talks—particularly 
high-profi le ones like Copenhagen and 
Rio+20—are important worldwide teach-
ing moments on the problem of climate 
change, they also create unrealistic political pressure for 
a quick and easy solution to the problem. There is no sil-
ver bullet, and the process can’t be solved over the course 
of a few days of international negotiations every year.
Nevertheless, the talks are hyped up in the weeks lead-
ing up to the conferences, with expectations each year 
that “this will be the year” that something meaningful 
gets done. At each meeting, thousands of infl uential 
people from around the world gather to negotiate and 
infl uence global policy. Rhetoric fl ies for a week or two, 
negotiators bargain long into the night, and a modest, 
unenforceable agreement is fi nally brought up for a vote.
Critical nations are still at odds over central issues, 
such as the point at which developing countries should 
be required to meet emissions reductions. Sovereignty 
rules, and national interest will always trump global in-
terest. This makes it diffi cult to get countries to comply 
with rules established at the international level—par-
ticularly when such rules go against their short-term 
economic interests.
Obviously, one of the countries that has come un-
der the greatest criticism for its failure to deliver on its 
promises in these international negotiations has been 
the United States.
After failing to sign on to the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. 
has since made only lukewarm commitments during re-
cent negotiations—despite a president who supports ac-
tion on climate change. The ultra-partisan Congress of 
the past few years makes it diffi cult to get even moder-
ate, popular measures passed—let alone move forward 
on the hot-button issue of climate change.5
The U.S. Congress has become highly politicized 
around the issue of climate change. Despite broad in-
ternational acceptance of climate science, the U.S. Con-
gress has waged an ideological battle out of what should 
be seen as a practical issue. Climate change deniers are 
often given equal weight as climate scientists in main-
stream media, and some politicians continue to down-
play increasingly clear scientifi c evidence and oppose 
the idea of regulation as a solution.
The growing partisan politics in the U.S. Congress has 
delayed the confi rmation of Obama’s appointment of 
a new Environmental Protection Agency (epa) admin-
istrator while also shifting federal policy on climate 
change to a weakened epa.
Despite efforts to stop it, the epa continues to slowly 
move ahead with regulating emissions under the Clean 
Air Act. The epa uses national energy data, data on na-
tional agricultural activities and other national statistics 
to provide a comprehensive accounting of total green-
house gas emissions for all human-generated sources in 
the United States.6 In accordance with the unfccc con-
vention, it prepares an annual report called the Inven-
tory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks. This 
report tracks total annual U.S. emissions and removals by 
source, economic sector and greenhouse gas, going back 
to 1990. Maintaining the inventory is an important start-
ing point, but to reduce emissions, the epa must be able 
to issue regulations. This is where it’s struggled.
In May 2010, the agency issued the U.S.’s fi rst regula-
tions for greenhouse gases: rules for passenger vehicles. 
But lawsuits and legislative and budget attacks from 
Congress have slowed down its efforts to go further.
Earlier this year, the epa announced that it was de-
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laying the issuance of new rules limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions from new power plants, originally sched-
uled to be fi nished in April 2013—and has given no new 
deadline for their completion. They would have been the 
fi rst federal greenhouse gas restrictions on the power 
sector, and would have prevented any new coal-fi red 
power plants from being built—signifi cantly affecting 
national emissions. 
Unfortunately, the rules limiting emissions for new 
power plants must be completed before rules for exist-
ing ones can be applied. So while the agency reworks 
the rules on new power plants, establishing rules for 
existing power plants—a more complex task—is also 
pushed back. As a result, action has been left largely to 
the states and local governments, leaving a patchwork 
quality to the regulations.
Immediate partisan politics aside, though, the very 
long-term intangible nature of climate change makes it 
diffi cult to mobilize and sustain domestic support for 
climate change policy. The dangers relating to climate 
change will mostly become apparent in the future and 
are diffi cult to predict with specifi city. Issues like water 
pollution and toxic waste provoke faster and more ac-
tive public responses than climate change because they 
have an immediate impact on lives. In addition, while 
the benefi ts of climate policies will also generally be 
felt in the future, or not noticed at all if successful, the 
changes necessary to reduce emissions—like a carbon 
tax—immediately affect day-to-day lives.
However, as the U.S. public begins to feel the impacts 
of climate change affecting their lives, support for gov-
ernment action may be growing. Persistent droughts, 
extended heat waves and the power of superstorms like 
Hurricane Sandy on coastal cities are beginning to change 
the way Americans think about and understand climate. 
This also sets the stage for a potentially more fruitful av-
enue for shaping both domestic and international policy.
Beyond the UN
O
n a global level, the lack of political support in 
the U.S. and internationally is tied to the criti-
cal question of when developing nations must 
begin to reduce their emissions—a question 
not adequately addressed under the current UN frame-
work. This issue is tied to growth and development—mak-
ing it a critical economic issue, not just an environmental 
issue. For this reason, two fundamental shifts in how 
climate talks are conducted need to be adopted.
The fi rst is to shift the forum. Climate talks have be-
come too important for the world’s more powerful na-
tions to assign negotiations to the UN’s deliberative 
bodies. As the implications of global climate policy be-
come clearer, the UN has become increasingly irrelevant 
as a decision-making venue.
The second shift is to broaden the scope of players 
and negotiators involved in the discussions. Due in part 
to the agenda-setting capacity of these talks, climate 
change has assumed a place at the center of commu-
nity, corporate, and national and local policymaking. 
It is no longer a second-tier issue relegated to “environ-
mental types,” but a key issue affecting profi ts, economic 
growth and political power.
Moving the issue beyond the UN auspices will signal 
that the world’s global policy-makers fi nally recognize 
the centrality and priority of these issues. As the global 
economy develops, it becomes increasingly important 
that global rules of the game be established and made 
enforceable. We not only need to ensure that companies 
can compete on a level playing fi eld, but that poor people 
are not asked to trade off food and shelter against expo-
sure to toxins. This will require new forms of global gov-
ernance that go beyond current institutional capacities.
This is not something the UN is set up to do, nor is 
there another organization in place today that could. It 
will likely take a crisis or similar precipitating event to 
As the implications of global
climate policy become clearer, 
the UN has become irrelevant 
as a decision-making venue.
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create an actionable body capable of addressing the in-
herent sovereignty issues that prevent real progress on 
climate change at the international level.
National self-interest still dominates the international 
policy arena—including in the UN. However, signs of 
change are emerging. With the growth of global corpo-
rations and some coordinated global governance around 
the economy, we see the beginnings of true international 
cooperation. Economic policy ought to be tied to the 
climate conversation because of its signifi cant impact 
on the global economy. Political power that doesn’t re-
fl ect economic power means very little. When we can 
get a small group of a dozen global economic leaders in 
a room thinking about the climate issue as an economic 
policy priority, we will have a form of global governance 
that can make real change.
At the same time, important movements and changes 
are occurring below the global level. While national 
governments are wrestling over pledges and commit-
ments on the world stage, real climate or emissions 
reduction goals can be achieved through local and, oc-
casionally, national efforts. Even in the U.S. this is hap-
pening widely and successfully.
Cities, in particular, have stepped up to the plate. Rec-
ognizing their unique vulnerabilities and opportunities, 
they are enacting far-sighted climate policy initiatives. 
The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group that brings 
together city leaders to discuss policy around the topic 
highlights some of the most pioneering efforts at ur-
ban climate policy across the globe. For example, New 
York City, in PlaNYC 2030—its long-term sustainability 
plan—pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
by more than 30 percent by 2030—and laid out plans, 
programs and laws to get it there.
Additionally, the growing cost of fossil fuels has stimu-
lated investment in renewable energy, edging the global 
economy closer to commercially viable alternatives. 
These trends could help provide an alternate route to 
climate mitigation, even without international treaties.
In the short term, substantive action on climate pol-
icy and management will involve regulation at local 
levels as well as advances in technology.
Change will come about because renewable energy 
will become less expensive, more reliable and more 
convenient than fossil fuels. Regulation, carbon taxes 
and treaties may hasten the process, but a focus on re-
search and development and new technology would 
be a far better approach than international spectacles 
and cocktail parties. Innovations in smaller and more 
effi cient solar cells, more advanced battery technol-
ogy, smart grids, and carbon capture and storage are 
all examples of technologies that, with additional sci-
entifi c breakthroughs, could substantially change the 
conversation.
The need, however, for international cooperation will 
remain. We are increasingly part of a global and inter-
connected world. International negotiations highlight 
areas of mutual self-interest and agreement among na-
tions. The transition to a fossil-fuel-free-economy will 
not be easy and will not happen quickly.
But a critical step has been taken. A fossil-fuel-free-
economy is  nearly universal goal. Fossil fuels, by def-
inition, are fi nite. We need to transition to another 
method to fuel our growing economy. We need to de-
velop a low-cost and convenient technology that will 
bring about this transition. Like cell phones replacing 
land lines, the technology will come—and when it does, 
the transition will follow.
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While national governments are 
wrestling over pledges, real 
emmissions reduction goals can be 
achieved through local efforts.
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